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The Case for ‘more Single Market’  
Jacques Pelkmans 
Introduction 
With the Commission’s consultation period on the 
Single Market Act (European Commission, 2010) 
nearing its end, it is high time for the EU to get its act 
together. Priority should immediately be restored to the 
issue of the Single Market, and EU powers to deepen 
and widen the internal market, where economically 
justifiable, ought to be utilized to the full. This CEPS 
Policy Brief explains why.  
After a recap of the fundamentals of the Single Market 
in the Union, the case for renewed vigour in deepening 
and widening the Single Market is made, based on five 
arguments. However, following Mario Monti’s (2010) 
insightful report, it is essential that the legitimacy 
questions surrounding ‘more Single Market’ be taken 
seriously at EU and at national level. A discussion of 
five sources of reticence or resistance is provided. In the 
conclusions, the political ownership of the Single 
Market imperative is regarded as critical, not only at EU, 
but also at national level. 
A reminder of the fundamentals 
‘More Single Market’ is not just one of those ‘fancy’ 
ideas in the EU loop; it has been at the core of the EU 
mission ever since the Rome Treaty. Making the 
fundamental values of the Union explicit in the treaty, 
and adding foreign policy and a zone of freedom, 
security and justice, are welcome moves, but they do not 
alter the fact that the hard competences of the EU are 
largely concentrated in the huge internal market and all 
that implies. The economic rationale behind the Single 
Market and its importance has remained largely 
unchanged since 1957. Of the four economic aims of the 
Rome Treaty, three were about economic growth and 
development.  
And the central ‘means’ of that treaty consisted of 
negative and positive market integration.
1  Mutatis 
mutandis this is also the case for the Lisbon Treaty. The 
overall economic aim of the EU Treaty (Art. 3/1, EU) 
now consists of the "well-being of its peoples", 
combining economic objectives with social and other 
objectives in Art. 3/3.
2 The economic objectives amount 
to a modern adaptation of those listed in the Rome 
Treaty, such as the “sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced growth” and related instrumental 
objectives such as a “highly competitive social market 
economy”, “social progress” and “scientific and 
technological advances”.  
The internal market dominates what the EU does and 
has accomplished. Two telling examples illustrate this. 
When in 1995 the countries from Central Europe wanted 
to incorporate the internal market (regulatory) acquis 
under ‘pre-accession’, the White Paper (European 
Commission, 1995) summing up this acquis covered no 
less than 23 of the 30 negotiating chapters of accession! 
When former Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti 
(2010) advocated an integrated internal market strategy, 
                                                      
1 See Pelkmans (2006, chapter 2) for a detailed analysis of the 
economic structure and logic of the Rome Treaty and its three 
successors. For the (Tinbergen) notions of negative and 
positive integration, see idem, chapter 1. Negative integration 
in the Rome Treaty boils down to the customs union, the four 
free movements and the right of establishment; positive 
integration consists of harmonization and/or common 
regulation and the common policies needed for the internal 
market to function properly (and overcome market failures for 
example).  
2 In Art. 3/4, EMU is mentioned but no (additonal) objective 
is added.  
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he pointed out that no less than 15 DGs of the 
Commission are involved; the Commission paper speaks 
of 13 DGs. The principal reason why so many are 
unaware of the overarching importance of the Single 
Market is that leading actors at the EU level often prefer 
to be associated with a specific policy or area of 
regulation. This preference leads them to conceal the 
internal market origin by using labels referring to areas 
of regulation or (common) policies, instead of the legal 
basis.  
The Single Market is therefore the Union’s core 
business. If the EU needs to restore or improve the 
socio-political legitimacy of the EU with the citizens, 
workers and consumers (as Monti has demonstrated), 
the internal market is bound to provide a large pool of 
options and opportunities, with the relevant legal powers 
in most cases. If the EU is hampered by existing barriers 
to market access and by omissions in the Single Market 
acquis, despite all the achievements, a new Single 
Market strategy should be designed as the centrepiece of 
any longer-term EU initiative. If the EU requires an exit 
strategy from the crisis, including a lessening of the 
burden of lowering sovereign debt, its principal means 
at the EU level of government is, once again, ‘more 
Single Market’, exactly as the treaty suggests.  
Why more Single Market? 
The case for more and a better Single Market rests on 
five sets of arguments, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
First, the treaties and Court of Justice (CJEU) case law 
make it abundantly clear that the internal market 
features as the ‘super workhorse’ of the EU. In Art. 3/3, 
first paragraph, the internal market is to serve four core 
socio-economic objectives of the Union, conditioned by 
four formidable policy constraints.
3 Essentially, it is still 
about economic growth (as in Rome) but with a host of 
conditionalities and add-ons. CJEU case law has always 
been important, too, for the deepening and sometimes 
the widening of the internal market. In particular, when 
moving beyond the relatively unproblematic goods and 
capital markets to those for services, labour and codified 
technology (e.g. IPRs), the CJEU has developed a 
tradition of ‘balancing’ rulings. These rulings tend to 
                                                      
3 Art. 3/3, first para. reads: "The Union shall establish an 
internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development 
of Europe based on balanced growth and price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment." See Art. 26, TFEU for the definition of the 
internal market, unchanged from Art. 14, EC or indeed the 
Single European Act. Note that Art. 26/1, TFEU speaks about 
the establishment and "ensuring" the “functioning” of the 
internal market, a crucial reference to the positive integration 
required to make the Single Market ‘work’.  
weaken the often severe constraints on or distortions of 
free movements in these three types of markets in the 
EU. However, the Court cannot go too far and risk a 
‘gouvernement des juges’, which would undermine 
legitimacy. Deepening or widening thus largely depends 
on the EU legislator. When the horizontal services draft 
directive was finally proposed (30 years too late), the 
EU legislator was compelled to overcome its long 
shirking of responsibilities with respect to the failure to 
establish an internal market for services. The EU patent 
might at long last follow other EU IPR legislation, 
mostly adopted one or two decades ago. In intra-EU 
movement of labour, the internal market logic is perhaps 
even more problematic. Art. 26/2 still defines the 
internal market without reference to “workers” or 
“labour” – only “persons” are mentioned – despite the 
subsequent Art. 45, TFEU which states firmly that 
"freedom of movement of workers shall be secured".  
Given the longstanding tradition (not in the Treaty) of 
host-country control in intra-EU migration as well as in 
the posted workers Directive, there is a major risk that 
rigid national labour markets and/or high minimum 
wage countries cannot accommodate the ‘free’ 
movement of labour. The reason is simple: for workers 
from low-wage EU countries, little or no demand for 
them will emerge as there is no advantage (perhaps even 
additional costs) to the companies in the high-wage 
country.
4 Furthermore, there are numerous other 
obstacles to cross-border movements of workers that are 
undoubtedly more severe than in goods, for example. 
There is a broad agenda in this area and it was ignored 
for decades. Only since 2001
5 has a hesitant beginning 
been made to address these many obstacles. Finally, 
there is the even deeper and rightly sensitive issue of the 
regulation of national labour markets linked to domestic 
welfare states, besides national (and distinct) traditions 
of industrial relations.  
                                                      
4 The Court in Celle, Niedersachsen, in asking a preliminary 
ruling from the CJEU in what is now known as the Rueffert 
case, wondered about ‘free’ movement and observed that 
host-country control caused (here Polish) workers ".. to lose 
the competitive advantage which they enjoy by reason of their 
lower wage costs. Consequently, the obligation… constitutes 
an impediment to market access." Equally with respect to 
“equality of treatment” and given “proportionality”, the Celle 
Court notes that “in the case of foreign workers, the obligation 
to comply with the collective agreements does not enable 
them to achieve genuine equality of treatment with German 
workers, but rather prevents [here, posted] workers … from 
being employed in Germany”. The CJEU sided with the Celle 
Court. Case C-346/06, ruling 3 April 2008.  
5 The first Commission paper to openly acknowledge the 
many barriers to intra-EU labour movements and announce it 
would address them was a COM paper entitled “New 
European Labour Markets, open to all, with access for all”, 
dated 1 March 2001.   
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There are sound subsidiarity grounds to support such 
national competences. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that their serious impact on the free movement 
of workers and (often) on the internal market for 
services (given the high labour content of services) 
should be totally exempt from reform. Indeed, without 
undermining national social competences and their 
socio-political legitimacy, there ought to be a 
European dimension in national labour and social 
policies. In the presence of such profound differences 
between the member states (which de facto act as 
distortions and hindrances of ‘free’ movement), it can 
only be the combination of complementary national 
and EU reform efforts that can generate significant 
welfare gains for the EU economy. 
Second, the economic motives for more and a better 
Single Market remain as important as ever. 
Politicians, journalists and many readers want to hear 
a single number, capturing the outcome of economic 
analysis. The single number is about economic 
growth. A better ‘sell’ is of course ‘growth and jobs’, 
although job numbers are even harder to simulate than 
growth.  Thus, the 1988 Cecchini Report on EC1992 
simulated a 4.5% addition to EU GNP, the 1996 
Monti review (ex post) reduced that to less than 2% 
(based on data of the years just after 1992, and a less 
than complete implementation at the time). A 
Bolkestein 2003 paper suggested some 2-plus % 
increment to GNP over the ten years since 1992 and 
the (very) approximate numbers currently suggested 
in the emerging debate on the Single Market Act 
range from 4% to 7% or even more (if all would be 
accomplished).
6 These numbers cannot do full justice 
                                                      
6 For the Cecchini Report, see Emerson et al. (1988); for 
the Monti Review, see European Economy, Reports and 
Studies, 1996, No. 4, December; for the Bolkestein paper, 
see European Commission, DG Markt, 2003; for the 
current debate, no overall study seems to be available, but 
Copenhagen Economics (2010) gives an estimated 4% of 
extra GDP for the Digital Single Market alone. All these 
studies have limitations and none captures everything 
proposed and/or imputes assumed (rounded) primary 
effects for domains not captured by the models. Thus, even 
if they may be optimistic on one element (e.g. Cecchini on 
public procurement), there always remains a significant 
number of effects inevitably not captured by the modelling. 
One example can clarify this. What long-run economic 
impact will the adoption of a single EU patent have for the 
EU economy? Even when the static effects of cost 
reduction (etc.) are approximated, the much more 
interesting dynamic impact on innovation efforts and their 
knock-on effects are exceedingly hard, if not too arbitrary 
to quantify. Yet, this does not render the EU patent less 
interesting or convincing. Quite the contrary! For a novel 
attempt to appreciate the Single Market gains over much 
longer periods, see Straathof et al. (2008); the authors 
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to the various internal market initiatives, because it is 
too much to expect that all (major) initiatives 
undertaken in the Single Market can be modelled. 
Example: although everybody realizes that the 
liberalisation of EU network industries has 
engendered profound changes in these markets, in 
some even having caused a transformation of business 
models and dramatic efficiency improvements over 
(say) 20 years, it is anybody’s guess to say how large 
the overall economic impact has been. Thus, 
technological and structural change makes it 
impossible to speak of ‘the’ gains from the telecoms 
internal market liberalisation since 1990, because the 
telecoms hardware and services of 1990 are simply 
incomparable with the infrastructure, equipment and 
services in 2011. Another example: in the new 
member states, the Single Market gains are both cause 
and consequence of deep structural change, especially 
intersectorally within industry plus the re-emergence 
of services, which renders the attribution of gains to 
the internal market as such next to impossible. Yet, 
these gains are real and large! The traditional CGE of 
other modelling is thus bound to drastically 
underestimate these Single Market gains. 
In any event, it is unhelpful to narrow the economic 
motivation for the Single Market down to single 
proxy numbers at the macro-economic level. The 
proper functioning of the internal market requires a 
close inspection of the functioning of specific markets 
or segments
7 in both goods and services. In this 
respect, the most important drive is found in the 
services markets, too long neglected at EU level and 
of paramount importance for any EU policy to acquire 
higher productivity growth in the longer run. It is only 
recently that serious analytical economic work on 
intra-EU services has begun. Pursuing this kind of 
economic analysis and building more effective, 
indeed intrusive liberalisation (where current 
protective regulation is not justified by market 
failures) on this basis is promising.
8 The horizontal 
                                                                                        
calculate effects on goods and services trade as well as 
foreign direct investment stocks over 50 years.  
7 As the Market Monitoring exercise, arisen from the 
November 2007 Internal Market Review, has clearly 
shown; example: food distribution and retail. Also, some 
Inquiries by DG Competition (e.g. retail banking; 
electricity and gas markets) have demonstrated this and 
yielded a wealth of detailed information as a basis for more 
effective EU policy action.  
8 Again, two examples: the FP7 ServiceGap project (2010-
13) aims to identify and further analyse the detailed 
channels of influence of (intra-EU) internationalization of 
services, both free movement and FDI, on long-run 
productivity growth. For details, see www.servicegap.org. 
In Kox et al. (2010), a very detailed empirical investigation 
is provided of the causes of the poor productivity 
 
services Directive 2006/123 does not, on the face of 
it, generate an impressive addition to GNP. A recent 
study by Van der Linden & Piette (2009) into its 
effects on Belgium demonstrates in some detail that 
the services falling under the Directive are typically 
not the ones where major obstacles to free movement 
are suspected; the impact on freer FDI (right of 
establishment), now that a blacklist of bad practices of 
member states is in force, seems a little more 
promising. However, this modelling approach cannot 
take into account the extensive and intensive 
screening exercise of thousands of domestic laws at 
the national and regional level that took place 
between 2007-09, nor can it easily incorporate the 
‘mutual evaluation’ exercise between the member 
states from 2010.
9 Interestingly, the Commission 
rightly capitalises on the surprisingly productive 
collaboration between the member states as well as 
among them and the Commission intends to pursue 
this route even further in the next few years. It is of 
course still true that the Directive is very badly 
drafted and has allowed far too many derogations. 
However, a successful drive at two levels of 
government might, at least to a significant degree, 
substitute for a revision of the Directive in 2012 when 
the ‘rendez-vous’ clause instructs a review and leaves 
open the option of revision. Should this drive turn out 
to be ineffective, the rendez-vous clause can still be 
seized as a crowbar to open these markets. 
Third, a deeper and wider Single Market will support 
the proper functioning of the eurozone, the monetary 
union of 17 EU countries. The basic idea behind that 
is that the ‘E’ of EMU ought to serve the proper 
functioning of the ‘M’. Given the recent turbulence in 
and around the eurozone, the contribution of ‘more 
Single Market’ to the better functioning of the 
eurozone might seem to be of lesser importance than a 
proper economic governance of EMU. In the very 
short run, it certainly is, but only because the 
weaknesses in the eurozone regime have prompted or 
amplified the sovereign debt crisis and the budgetary 
implications will reverberate for years to come. This 
is not how the eurozone is normally supposed to 
function. Better market functioning, especially in 
services and labour, is vital for a smooth operation of 
the eurozone. In Pelkmans et al., (2008), we 
                                                                                        
performance of European business services. The authors 
find, inter alia, that competitive pressures are muted, 
enabling all kinds of subscale and otherwise inefficient 
services providers to survive. In turn, this seems to be 
caused by restrictive regulation, making exit from the 
market as well as labour re-allocation overly costly.  
9 See COM (2011) 20 of 27 January 2011 and SEC (2011) 
102 of 27 January 2011 for detailed reporting on this 
amazing exercise and further action.   
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demonstrate that product (goods and services) 
markets reforms do help to lubricate adjustment 
processes in the euro area.
10 These reforms have a 
national and a eurozone-wide aspect, preferably 
working hand-in-glove. Of course, product market 
reforms have to be complemented by greater 
flexibility in national labour markets, helped in the 
margin by fewer distortions of and barriers to free 
movement of (migrating or temporary) workers. It 
should be emphasised that such market flexibilities 
need not be associated with ‘American’ labour market 
regimes at all, nor, for that matter, be suspected of 
being ‘asocial’ in some other sense. Combining a 
degree of worker security of having (easy access to) 
work with flexible markets has, so far, been achieved 
by EU countries which are amongst the most ‘social’ 
in the Union, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, 
and to a lesser extent by Austria. Such EU countries 
also have low unemployment (and high employment 
rates), including low youth unemployment. As has 
been noted by several authors, the improvement in the 
functioning of the eurozone allows the ECB to 
accommodate such reforms, which renders them less 
costly in the short run and hence more acceptable to 
voters.  
Fourth,  external economic pressures on the Union 
constitute yet another set of arguments to bolster the 
internal market. Although EU countries trade and 
invest far more in the Union than they have economic 
exchange with the rest of the world, many value 
chains that ‘end’ inside the Union are intercontinental 
in nature. The more far-reaching ones tend to chop up 
‘tasks’ in that chain – often goods inputs but 
increasingly also certain service inputs – and spread 
the execution of these ‘tasks’ over the globe. 
Allocation of the work is determined by dynamic 
comparative advantages and proximity to intermediate 
product markets and to final markets. This happens 
inside companies as well as in networks or alliances. 
Capital markets are more and more globalized and 
even R&D in specific sectors (e.g. pharmaceuticals; 
electronics) has been transferred to other continents. 
The counterpart to these developments is the steady 
further sharpening of competition in more and more 
submarkets, in the world more generally as well as in 
Europe. All this raises the costs of neglecting the 
                                                      
10 Based on the Blanchard & Quah methodology of 
identifying demand and supply shocks, we use an 
econometric approach applied to 11 eurozone countries 
over data for 35 years. ‘Better adjustment’ or resilience to 
shocks is measured as the cumulative output growth loss 
over 8 years for the case of supply shocks and the 
cumulative inflation change over 8 years for both demand 
and supply shocks. This is refined to sectors in goods and 
services. It is striking that sectoral and country rigidities 
clearly matter; hence, so do the reforms. 
Single Market and of the unwillingness to reform the 
process. It also causes European companies to miss 
out on dynamism and innovation that would provide 
greater opportunities in markets outside Europe. This 
is not just a big business cause. It is crucial for 
dynamic and innovative SMEs to test markets beyond 
their home turf. Occasionally, some might succeed 
directly in third markets, including the BRICs. But for 
most SMEs, even the participation in the Single 
Market seems to be a considerable challenge. 
Confirming earlier impressionistic surveys with new 
in-depth data crunching, Mayer & Ottoviano (2007) 
show that of the millions of companies in the EU, 
only a fraction of them belong to the ‘happy few’ 
participating in the Single Market, with yet another 
fraction of the happy few active in many more 
national EU markets beyond the neighbours. 
Typically, only the more highly performing firms 
survive and thrive in the Single Market. This is 
precisely the reason why Europe’s productivity 
growth would be well-served by facilitating greater 
participation by SMEs, via less red tape but above all 
by reducing or eliminating remaining, often subtle 
obstacles and distortions, especially in services 
markets (where SMEs are far more dominant than in 
goods). The point extends to (SMEs’) access to 
finance, not least venture capital, where tax and other 
problems still create unnecessary hurdles. Venture 
capital is most unlikely to be given if the Single 
Market would not be securely open to such innovative 
entrepreneurs.  
Fifth, lubricating and stimulating the ‘inner dynamics’ 
of European market integration forms another, low-
key but worthwhile reason to encourage ‘more Single 
Market’.  The inner dynamics arise from the 
permanent revisions of the regulatory acquis of the 
internal market. The main source of this ‘inner 
dynamics’ is found in the exceptions and 
imperfections of first- (or, even second-) generation 
directives in the Single Market acquis. These 
shortcomings are routine in ‘Brussels’ due to political 
compromises, fears about adjustment for workers or 
companies or vested interests. Numerous directives 
now undergo reviews after so many years and this can 
often be an occasion to ‘deepen’ market integration 
by removing gaps or omissions. At times, new 
insights, new forms of competition or new 
technologies might add pressure to deal with the 
weaknesses in EU regulation. This kind of ‘creeping 
integration’ is usually sound and today’s EU 
regulatory impact assessment serves as a helpful filter 
to keep biased or distortive regulation to a minimum. 
Thus, all network industries have gone through at 
least three stages of liberalisation combined with EU 
regulation (broadcasting perhaps only two), financial 
services are currently in the fourth generation of 
directives, diploma (qualifications) recognition has 
also gone through several stages, the New Approach  
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has been upgraded and perfected after 23 years, 
chemical regulation has been profoundly revised and 
upgraded with REACH, much of EU environmental 
regulation has become (more) market- or incentive-
based, directives on counterfeiting have been 
toughened, etc. At times, ‘Better EU Regulation’ can 
prompt the removal of EU directives that appear not 
to be justified (e.g. dozens of directives on the shape 
and size of fruit and vegetables) or can cause 
revisions with less red tape or lower SME 
requirements. In such instances, there is not ‘more’ 
Single Market but less regulatory burden (say, a 
‘better’ Single Market). The obligation to do a review 
can be seen as an autonomous mechanism driving the 
process, but priority setting (for the Single Market) or 
the avowed desire to go for a ‘better’ Single Market 
via Better Regulation creates a much more favourable 
policy setting and a meaningful reference to 
overarching socio-economic objectives of the EU. 
Without such setting, revisions – especially of one 
isolated directive - risk being relegated solely to 
technocrats and sector specialists, since there is no 
political gain whatsoever, and MEPs or Council might 
be too easily captured by specific interests. For larger 
initiatives, these pitfalls can be avoided. The 2008 
Goods package (now referred to as the New 
Legislative Framework) on the improvement of the 
New and Global Approach stands out as an excellent 
example of how useful ‘creeping integration’ can 
actually be, if consensus is forged and preparations 
carefully worked out with all stakeholders. In many 
other cases, it seems preferable to include them in 
Single Market strategies driven by the highest levels 
of political leadership.  
Reticence and resistance 
Monti’s 2010 Report on more Single Market is a 
landmark. His deep and broad strategic analysis of the 
socio-political legitimacy problems surrounding more 
market and in particular more Single Market is 
required reading for all EU policy-makers, whether in 
national capitals or in the Brussels circuit. Agreeing 
with the thrust and relevance of his approach and with 
most of the proposals [Pelkmans, 2010b], Monti 
might nevertheless be a little too pessimistic about the 
resolve of EU policy-makers, given the political 
hangover – at the time of writing and consulting – 
from the crisis and the echoes of tumultuous debates 
on the EU Constitution, the Services Directive, 
REACH and the free (East-West) movement of EU 
workers. The upheavals in the EU of five to six years 
ago no longer constitute a major argument about deep 
resistance: the draft constitution has become law as 
the Lisbon Treaty in a revised form; REACH has been 
mainstreamed and its agency works quite well and the 
Services Directive as adopted is hardly 
controversial.
11 The aftermath of the crisis having 
turned into a sovereign debt crisis is problematic, if 
not a menace to hopes of swift recovery, but it does 
have a silver lining: in practically all EU countries, 
and even more so in the euro area, excessive 
privileges and rigidities are no longer as invulnerable 
as before and this can generate a double dividend of 
‘easier’ national reforms and a greater preparedness to 
pursue an ambitious Single Market agenda.  
Of course, all this does not mean that there is no 
reticence about or resistance to a Single Market Act. 
Figure 2 summarises five types of reticence or 
resistance and these are discussed below. 
First, although the Treaty, amplified by case-law, 
gives a very important position to the internal market, 
there are still a few gaps and omissions in the Treaty 
logic. Vetoes have mostly disappeared, but not on the 
EU patent and not on some labour issues linked to the 
welfare state. On services the old treaty, text from 
1957 has never been changed or updated, which sets 
limits on the CJEU case law in this respect. The 
Meroni doctrine prohibiting independent (regulatory) 
EU agencies (say, for network industries), hinges on a 
straightforward constitutional logic of delegation (the 
principle of conferral). However, its extreme rigidity 
and disregard for internal market fragmentation is 
glaringly inconsistent with the aims and instrumental 
objectives (such as the ‘functioning’ internal market) 
of that very treaty.
12 
Second, whatever the exact substance of the Internal 
Market Act, there is bound to be the classical political 
economy  resistance of vested interests which, 
unfortunately, gets translated by some member states 
into their ‘public interest’, although often it is 
manifestly against their public interest. This conduct 
cannot be effectively countered by proper impact 
assessment because the Council and the European 
Parliament are political organs and can ignore or by-
pass the results from Commission’s now careful and 
rigorous impact assessments. 
                                                      
11 Note that member states have been highly cooperative in 
the implementation, screening and mutual evaluation 
phases of the directive. More generally, it would seem that 
many of the initial fears about services liberalisation have 
withered away, if only because services and their economic 
significance have become better understood.  
12 See, for example Pelkmans & Renda (2011) for striking 
empirical evidence on the so-called EU internal market for 
eCommunications, which turns out to be deeply 
fragmented. Note, too, that not only is the lingering 
fragmentation in network industries insufficiently tackled, 
the complexity of today’s EU agencies, which do have 
internal market related functions, is costly and 
dysfunctional.   
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Figure 2. Why NOT more Single Market? 
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The unique virtue of EC1992 was that the internal 
market imperative at the time was too overwhelming 
to be easily questioned. The walls of many 
protectionist or anti-competitive ‘Jerichos’ were 
tumbling down, to wit, insurance, selected national 
quotas against Japanese cars, scheduled air transport, 
the national inward-looking bastions of veterinary and 
phyto-sanitary protection, exchange controls and a 
range of smaller ones. It is illusionary to expect such a 
consensual drive to take place again. But sustained 
political ownership of an ambitious programme by the 
Commission and the European Council would at least 
be very helpful to minimize or overrule such 
resistance.  
Third,  national autonomy in regulation and public 
services is rightly sensitive and ought to be respected 
where justified. The EU should only centralise where 
a sound, functional subsidiarity test supports it, 
otherwise it simply should not. However, the relevant 
question is whether the EU level is really the problem 
in Single Market matters. The answer is: more often 
than not, the member states are really the problem. 
This resistance can take different forms. One is to 
draw ‘red lines’ (such as taxation for the UK ever 
since the constitution debates), a purely political act 
of refusal no matter how persuasive and beneficial 
(say) EU regulation of some aspects can be. Another 
is to invoke national regulatory discretion, even when 
impact assessment has shown that (in the relevant 
aspects) this discretion causes unnecessary and costly 
fragmentation.
13 A third one is found in the 
unquestioned protection of national regulatory 
agencies in network markets despite the hindrances 
that this causes when attempting to arrive at a Single 
Market. In other words, although EU regulation is 
inevitably geared to establishing or improving the 
internal market (its legal basis), the EU interest does 
not assume priority in Council. A fourth one is more 
difficult to assess. Insofar as ‘services of general 
economic interest’ (SGEIs) have been identified by 
member states – they have this prerogative – it is 
crucial for a proper functioning of the Single Market 
and potential competitors therein, as well as for the 
national services providers, to be sure about the exact 
boundaries of national powers concerning SGEIs (or 
the non-economic variant of public services). 
Lingering uncertainty is probably not helped by a 
dedicated horizontal directive, as some claim, but this 
does not take away the anxiety. Borderline questions 
may also arise for domains such as public health, 
education, social housing and the media, for example. 
The Commission is advised to find more effective 
ways of solving these legitimate concerns. 
                                                      
13 The example of some 150 exceptions, adding up all the 
member states, in the application of common EU rules for 
banking supervision before the crisis began, comes to mind 
as a telling example.   
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Fourth, and following Monti’s insightful analysis, 
reticence may result from a lack of socio-political 
legitimacy of the Single Market with voters, workers, 
citizens and SMEs. Legitimacy issues concerning the 
EU have become paramount. Basically, it is simple: 
legitimacy must be earned. Thus, these questions have 
to be taken very seriously by the EU level and even 
more by national politicians when speaking out or 
acting on EU matters. The EU’s legitimacy with 
voters and others has suffered for a host of reasons 
and few of them are easy to deal with. Much of the 
reticence is a consequence of the confluence of many 
sensitive new issues in the decade after (say) 2000.
14  
There is also a lingering sentiment that the Single 
Market has brought (too) little for consumer rights, 
for labour unions in the four countries without 
minimum wage legislation (creating problems for 
posted workers as well as for keeping up long-
standing national traditions of setting wages) and for 
citizens. The Commission initiative on citizens’ 
rights
15 is therefore most welcome and one can only 
hope that its advocacy will be heard much louder than 
so far since late October, and directly towards EU 
citizens. The ‘social dimension’ of the internal market 
is, at times, still played up by certain forces. One 
wonders whether there is much substance to such 
complaints.
16 First of all, the Convention on the draft 
constitution, in Working Group 11 (on the social 
dimension), concluded that the status quo was ‘just 
right’. Second, member states and national social 
partners mostly act nationally and for good reasons. 
What substantive shifts of social policies or regulation 
to the EU level should be undertaken? Third, the 
limited social acquis is not at all trivial. There is 
considerable minimum labour market regulation and 
the acceptance of host-country control in migration. 
In occupational health and safety as well as gender 
rights, the EU has strong powers and has used them. 
But welfare states are and ought to remain national 
and industrial relations no less so. In short, today’s 
EU social dimension is broadly what we want!  
                                                      
14 The more important ones are: two Eastern enlargements 
with low-wage countries, the EU constitution debates, two 
referenda with a ‘No’ and the Lisbon Treaty delays, 
permanent market reform drives, tensions on budget 
discipline in the eurozone before the crisis, upheavals about 
the services directives and about REACH, the candidature 
of Turkey for EU membership and anxieties about 
globalization, seen by some as facilitated by the Single 
Market as its ‘agent’.  
15 See COM (2010) 603 of 27 October 2010, EU 
Citizenship report 2010, dismantling the obstacles to EU 
citizens’ rights. 
16 See Pelkmans (2010a and 2008).  
But the irresponsible conduct of national politicians 
engaging in cheap ‘EU bashing’ (and that is not the 
same as criticism) without context and for very short-
term political gains (publicity of a kind), is a disease 
that, over time, acts like erosion in nature. In 
particular in a huge and technical domain like the 
Single Market, many national politicians can get away 
with almost any assertion or cynical remark and little 
or no correction will ever take place. The reduced 
socio-political legitimacy has prompted academic 
analysts to argue that the old ‘permissive consensus’ 
of the first three decades of the EU has melted away. 
As a consequence, progress in the internal market, for 
example, is bound to be slow and difficult, time and 
again, and it may also fail. This point is influential in 
EU policy circles, too, but it is a weak argument at 
best; more likely, it is simply wrong. Those who 
recall the ‘permissive consensus’ of former days 
apparently forget, all too conveniently, that these were 
the days of vetoes and threats of vetoes, with a 
chilling effect on Commission activities and 
ambitions; endless negotiations about trivial and 
partial internal market directives; silly and costly 
compromises (including ‘optional’ harmonisation); 
taboos on services in general; no mutual recognition; 
little or no reference to European standards; a CJEU 
case against the Council of Transport ministers 
launched by the EP and a fairly narrow manifestation 
of EU competition policy (e.g. no mergers as leading 
national competition authorities refused to give in and 
political obstacles to more rigour in state aids 
supervision).  
If the ‘permissive consensus’ worked as asserted, it 
was probably due to vetoes, loopholes, taboos and 
major gaps in the acquis, plus strong powers of the 
member states. The Single Market today needs to be 
legitimate in the eyes of voters but its ambition is 
much greater, the taboos far fewer, the vetoes reduced 
to a few and justifications of Commission proposals 
more convincing due to impact assessment.  
Finally, a significant problem for ‘more Single 
Market’ is the overload of the EU agenda. There are 
quite a few competing EU agenda priorities such as 
climate strategy, the various ‘flagships’ of EU2020 
and some new powers under the Lisbon Treaty. In the 
eurozone the exit strategy has, so far, been dominated 
by rescue funds, tough budgetary measures and the 
gradual move to better ‘economic governance’. Only 
very recently has the issue of resuming economic 
growth in Europe begun to rise on the EU agenda. 
The Single Market squarely belongs to the growth 
strategy, even it though it stretches wider (e.g. 
citizens’ issues). It is the task of the European Council 
to clarify in no uncertain terms that the Single Market 
cannot and should not be regarded as ‘low politics’ 
compared to the ‘high politics’ of economic 
governance. The ‘high politics’ of merely repairing  
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the fault lines of the eurozone regime amount to little 
more than a containment of costs and frantic political 
dealing to keep the club together in times of extreme 
stress. It is so conspicuous because of the direct 
consequences for national budgets and so sensitive 
since some moderate degree of (first unwanted) 
centralisation or deeper coordination cannot be 
avoided, whether in market regulation and supervision 
or in rescue funds and the profound repercussions of 
sustainable public finance over decades to come. 
However, long-run economic growth is generated by 
market players, helped by sound infrastructure 
investments. The European Council should urgently 
refocus and invest its potentially enormous political 
energies on the triptych of a) ‘more Single Market’, b) 
national labour and services markets reforms, and c) 
infrastructure in a European (and not national) 
perspective.  
Conclusion 
The case for ‘more Single Market’ is strong and rests 
on many pillars. It should urgently be turned into 
action, and in a strategic way. The Union cannot 
afford for action in this vast area to be splintered over 
many sectors without clear, overarching socio-
economic goals and credible common political 
ownership. We have seen far too little of this and the 
awareness of this or interest on the part of the Council 
and/or the European Council is also virtually non-
existent (other than paying lip service). 
The sovereign debt crisis or the governance of the 
eurozone does not justify further neglect of the pursuit 
of ‘more Single Market’. Relegating the Single 
Market to a lower priority is not only short-sighted, it 
is a plain and serious policy failure.  
What matters for pursuing ‘more Single Market’ 
successfully is that the issues of socio-political 
legitimacy are taken seriously at both the EU and the 
national levels. National governments and 
parliamentarians are vital to restoring legitimacy with 
voters and others. This CEPS Policy Brief shows that 
the climate for deepening and setting up new 
initiatives is improving, whilst the extreme anxieties 
of five or six years ago have largely abated.  
It remains imperative, however, that the European 
Council shows leadership and political ownership of 
‘more Single Market’ and that the national political 
leaders carry the message home as part and parcel of 
domestic political processes. The core argument for 
more Single Market – though not the only one – is the 
resumption of economic growth as a handmaiden of 
the EU’s exit strategy from the sovereign debt crisis. 
It should also support global competitiveness of the 
Union’s economy and help lubricate the proper 
functioning of the eurozone. The ideal strategy is a 
combination of more Single Market, more daring 
domestic reforms in labour and services and adequate 
infrastructure investments with a European 
perspective. This will serve as the micro-economic 
foundation of an overall economic strategy for the 
Union today.
17  
Some resistance is to be expected as a routine 
manifestation of EU politics – in itself a sound form 
of acquiring or reconfirming legitimacy. Beyond that, 
political choices will have to be made, in particular by 
member states, and this ought to be facilitated by a far 
more explicit and authoritative priority setting by the 
European Council. Among these political choices, a 
somewhat greater acceptance of modest and targeted 
centralisation, where justified by subsidiarity testing, 
is required. If this can be accomplished to ensure the 
sustainability of national fiscal policies in the 
eurozone, it is hard to grasp why similar functional 
arguments would not be acceptable for overcoming 
the lingering fragmentation of the internal market, 
which is hindering the badly needed resumption of 
economic growth in the Union. 
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